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LIMITATIONS UPON THE PROSECUTION'S SUMMATION
TO THE JURY
A. Arthur Davis
It is an established fact that the accused in a criminal trial is protected by
a great many substantive and procedural safeguards.' It is equally clear
that the philosophy behind these protective devices places other specific limitations on the prosecution's actual conduct during the trial, and specifically on
the summation to the jury. This is because the prosecutor is considered a
quasi-judicial officer of the court, charged not only with prosecuting the
state's case2 against the defendant, but also with protecting the interest of the
defendant.
As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, a prosecuting
attorney "may prosecute with eagerness and vigor-indeed, he should do so,
1. See Roper v. Territory, 7 N.M. 255, 272; 33 Pac. 1014 (1893) (dissenting opinion of
Freeman, J.) 'We have long since passed the period when it is possible to punish an innocent man. We are now struggling with the problem as to whether it is any longer possible
to punish the guilty. Every safeguard that wisdom can suggest or experience improve has
been invoked by the law. Every intendment and presumption is in favor of the accused.
No matter though he may have lived a life of crime, an indictment raises the presumption
of innocence. The law gives him compulsory process for witnesses, and the judge assigns
him counsel if he has none. The jury are told to regard him as an innocent man, and
every device that legal acumen can suggest are placed at his disposal. He challenges the
state to prove his guilt; and, though a thousand errors be committed in his favor, they
are past recall. He enjoys not only the fruits of all the mistakes that are made in his
favor, but the mistakes that are made against him serve a still better purpose of vitiating
a conviction. This is as it should be."
2. State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1941) ; Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 23 So.
2d 558 (1945); People v. Tassiello, 300 N.Y. 425, 91 N.E. (2d) 872 (1950) ; Goddard v. State,
143 Fla. 28, 196 So. 596 (1940) ; Balis v. State, 137 Neb. 835, 291 N.W. 477 (1940) (in which
case there is an excellent pinpoint picture of many of the problems discussed within this
comment including prejudicial remarks, personal belief as to the guilt of the accused, and
presumption of innocence all of which are discussed before the court decides to reverse a
forgery conviction and order a new trial) ; McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593
(1943) ("It is often said and often forgotten that the duty of a prosecuting attorney is not
to convict defendants but to try them fairly. Absolute fairness is the counsel of perfection.") ; Hall v. Reagan, 60 F. Supp. 820 (1945) (". . . it is as much the duty of the State's
Attorney and the Trial Judge to protect the rights of the defendant on trial as it is the
duty of the State's Attorney to secure a conviction . . .").
Taliaferro v. United States, 47 F.2nd 699 (1931); Turk v. United States, 20 F.2d 129
(1927) ; Sunderland v. United States, 19 F.2d 202 (1927). For the same type of cases concerning state prosecutors see Wilbanks v. State, 28 Ala. App. 456, 185 So. 770 (1939)
("The state does not deserve convictions of persons charged with crime unless the jury is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty as charged, unaided by impassioned appeals ... by the solicitor whose sole duty is to see that state's cases are properly
presented to the court.); Young v. State, 141 Fla. 529, 195 So. 569 (1940) ; People v.
Schneider, 362 Ill. 478, 200 N.E. 321 (1936) ; People v. Black, 367 Ill. 209, 10 N.E. 2d 801
(1937) ; People v. Crabb, 372 I1. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46 (1940) (where the court said that the
state's attorney owes a duty not only to the people of the county and the state, but also to
the accused.).
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but while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one.' ' A prosecutor, then, is burdened with a two fold duty which
presents him with a difficult problem in conducting his case, for the line that
separates the "hard blows" from the "foul" is at best a nebulous one. Because of the difficulty in applying this distinction it is not surprising that
prosecutors may be losing casei which should result in conviction. 4 The reason
for this may be that because of a fear of reversals and an overconsciousness
of these limitations, they do not take advantage of the possibilities which may
be open to them.
Nowhere in the course of the trial is this difficulty more apparent than in
the summation to the jury. It is the purpose of this comment to examine
those areas of argument which have presented the most perplexing problems
to the prosecutor, and to attempt to define, as much as the cases will permit,
the line beyond which the prosecutor may not venture. In considering the
suggestions 'which are made as a result of this analysis, the prosecutor should
keep in mind that it is of extreme importance to avoid reversals and new
trials, and that admonition by the trial judge, although distasteful, is not so
serious. Although it may be embarrassing to the prosecutor to be corrected
in open court, it does not generally affect the outcome of the trial nor cost the
state the added expense of a new trial.
Comments on the Failure of the Accused to Testify
The problem presented by a defendant's refusal to testify is a subject
which does not readily lend itself to any general rule which would be of value
to a prosecutor in helping him to answer the question as to how far he can go
in his summation to the jury with regard to the failure of the accused to
testify. The real problem is to distinguish between those comments which
will cause reversal, those which will merely be stricken from the record by the
trial court, and those which will be allowed. While the prosecuting attorney
should be conscious of the possibility of reversal, this possibility should not
force him to abandon what he thinks will be a worthwhile and appropriate
form of argument. Before making an analysis of the holdings, the basis for
what is termed the present "general rule" should be established. As a rule
of thumb it might be said that the prosecutor may not comment on the failure
of the accused to testify.5 However, what we are here interested in is what
exceptions there are to this rule, and what the consequences of erroneous
remarks will be.
It might be well at the outset to point out that the basis for the rule in state
courts is not the United States Constitution. 6 Even in federal criminal pro3. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
4. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §21 (3d ed. 1940) ("There seems to be a constant neglect of
the pitiful cause of the injured victim, and the solid claims of law and order. All the
sentiment is thrown to weight the scales for the criminal-that is, not for the mere accused
who may be presumed innocent, but for the man who upon the record plainly appears to
be the offender that the jury have pronounced him to be.").
5. United States v. Sprengel, 103 F.2d 876 (1934) ("The law is well settled that a
defendant can not be compelled to testify against himself and that a prosecuting attorney
may not comment on his failure to so testify."). The holding in this case is applicable to
the federal courts. For a complete discussion of the problem in the state courts see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Also see, VIII WiGMoRE, EvmE cN §412 (3d ed.
1940) for a summation of the statutory provisions of all the states.
6. Adamson v. California, see Note 5 surfa
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ceedings the defendant's rights are granted by statute rather than by an interpretation of the prohibition against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment
alone.7 In 1878 the federal courts established for their own use the rule that
failure of the accused to testify did not create any presumption against him.8
The majority of the states have statutes or common law rulings to the same
effect. However, there are jurisdictions which allow considerable latitude in
this area, and it therefore becomes important to determine what the rules are
which govern the prosecutor's comments on the failure of the accused to
testify.
The Kentucky courts have consistently held that a prosecutor's comment on
the defendant's failure to testify is ground for reversal; yet in the case of
Brooks v. OommonweaZth,9 where the defense attorney attempted to explain
the failure of the defendant to testify, and the prosecutor commented on the
failure, the court held that such comment was not improper. Other qualifications which the Kentucky courts have made to the general rule, which may
allow the district attorney more latitude, appear in cases where the reference
to failure of the accused to testify is not direct enough.' 0 For example, in
1
Miller v. Commonwealth,"
where the prosecutor in his argument to the jury
said, "No witness has gone upon that stand to deny the statements made...
that the defendant had had intercourse with [her]," it was held that this was
not a comment direct enough to be considered improper.
The Illinois courts show an interesting distinction which may be a very
basic one, depending upon the interpretation given to the two cases involved.
People v. Donahoe' 2 held that the prosecutor may comment upon the fact that
the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses is uncontradicted. This was
allowed despite the fact that it appeared obvious that the defendant was the
only person who could have contradicted such testimony, and that he did not
testify. A later Illinois case held that the fact that the prosecutor referred
to the failure of the defendant to go to the stand and testify, or to produce
any witness to establish his innocence was in and of itself reversible error.'3
What the court left unsaid was whether it considered the error to be the comment on the failure of the defendant to testify or the comment that the defense had produced no witnesses to prove innocence. In any event, these
cases illustrate that there are certainly instances where it does not jeopardize
defendant's basic right to make a comment of the sort here considered. Even
in those jurisdictions where statements of this type by the prosecuting attorney
are considered to be prejudicial many of the courts have held that the error
7. Bruce. The Right To Comment Upon the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31
Mica. L. REv. 226 (1933) ; Swope, Constitutionality of a Comment on Defendant's Failure
to Testify, 37 Mica. L. REV. 777 (1939).
S. Milton v. United States, 110 F.2d 556 (1940) contains the Act of March 16, 1878, 20
Stat. 30, 28 U.S.C.A. 632. "In the trial of all indictments, informations, complaints, and
other proceeding against persons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses and misdemeanors, in the United States courts, territorial courts, and courts-martial, and courts of
inquiry, in any state or Territory, including the District of Columbia, the person so
charged shall, at his own request but not otherwise be a competent witness. And his failure
to make such request shall not create any presumption against him."
9. 281 Ky. 415, 136 S.W.2d 552 (1940).
10. Arant v. State, 232 Ala. 275, 167 So. 540 (1936) ("Nobody knows how they were
shot but him [defendant], and whether he will ever state itvor not, I don't know." This
was held too indirect to be error.). People v. Clement, 285 I1. 614, 121 N.E. 213 (1918)
("Not one scintilla of evidence to contradict the state's case . . ." This was held to be a
not unwarranted reference to failure of the accused to testify).
11.

153 Va. 890, 149 S.E. 459 (1929).

12. 198 Ill.
App. 1, aff. 279 Ill.
411, 117 N.E. 105 (1917).
13. People v. Ayers, 250 Ill.
App. 526 (1928).
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can be corrected by an admonition from the trial judge. 14 It is not advocated, of course, that prosecutors knowingly make prejudicial remarks merely
because such remarks would result in admonitions of the trial judge rather
than a mistrial.
In federal decisions it has been held that even in the most flagrant and
open violation of the federal rule against comments on the failure of the
accused to testify that the trial judge's instructions corrected the error. 15
State courts have also followed this line of reasoning.' 6 The minority rule
that remarks by the prosecutor on the failure of the accused to testify, made
in violation of statute, are so prejudicial that they can not be cured in any
ease by7 instructions to the jury has never been adopted in more than eleven
states.'
The final factor that seems to be pertinent is the effect that the withdrawal
of the comment by the prosecutor will have. It has been held that if he withdraws his statement there will be no sufficient ground for reversal of the
case.' 8 This result has been held to be further strengthened where the withdrawal has been supplemented by instructions from the court that such statements are not to be considered by the jury.' 9
From an examination of these cases it may be seen that no universal rule
can be proposed as to what the prosecuting attorney may say in his summation to the jury concerning the failure of the accused to testify. Some states
will allow him to make the comment where the defense attorney had mentioned
it previously. Others will allow it where the reference is "indirect."
Even
where it is held error to make a comment many courts say that it is merely
error; others adopt the view that a withdrawal of the remark by the prosecutor, coupled with instructions, or either one alone, will suffice in correcting
it. Still others say that the judge's instructions alone will correct it.
Expression of Opinion as to the Guilt of the Accused
A prosecutor may nullify all of his efforts in obtaining a conviction by an
improper comment on the guilt of the defendant. Here again there may be
formulated a rule of thumb which, however, upon full investigation, is found
not to be universally applicable. The rule, as generally stated, is that the
prosecuting attorney may not express his personal opinion or belief as to
the guilt of the accused in such a way as to permit the jury to think that his
opinion is based on information not placed in evidence. 20 However, it is important to avoid taking this statement too literally. To examine its practical
14. Morton v. State, 207 Ark. 704, 182 S.W.2d 675 (1944); Cahill v. People, 111 Colo.
173, 138 P.2d 936 (1943).
15. United States v. Di Carlo, 64 F.2d 15 (1933) (where the prosecutor said, "The
defendant has not taken the stand," the court said that the instruction that, "the fact that
he did or did not take the stand is not to create any presumption against him," corrected
the error.)
16. State v. McKeever, 339 Mo. 1066, 101 S.W.2d 22 (1936) (this case gives a good summation of many of the problems encompassed in this comment and is recommended as
worthy of a careful reading.)
17. See Note, 68 A.L.R. 1109 (1929) ; s4 A.L.R. 786 (1933). The eleven states are
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South
Dakota and Texas. Indiana changed to the majority rule in 1900. See Blum v. State, 154
Ind. 343, 56 N.E. 771 (1900).
18. State v. England, 321 Mo. 633, 12 S.W.2d 37 (1928); State v. Baker, 246 Mo. 357,
376, 152 S.W. 46, 52 (1923) (where the court said, "No case has yet held that remarks of
counsel in argument which were withdrawn by counsel constituted reversible error.")
19. Green v. United States, 266 Fed. 777 (1921).
20. 23 C.J.S. §1104, p. 578.
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significance we turn again to the really important question, 'Where will a
violation of this rule mean a reversal, and where will it at worst be cited as
error and stricken from the record!"
The case of People v. Brown 21 presents an almost perfect example of a
completely misdirected remark by the prosecuting attorney. There the prosecutor in his closing argument to the jury, said, "there must have been something in that testimony that did not convey innocence to that coroner's jury,
because they didn't give him a clear bill of health." This remark was found
to be cause for reversal. It is apparent that the impression conveyed to the
jury by such a comment was that there was some damaging fact that the
state was aware of but for some unknown reason had not been able to introduce against the defendant. Or that some other jury, about which this jury
knows nothing, has already made a decision as to this issue. Reversals have
also resulted from remarks such as, "I know defendant was2 2guilty, or he
would not have fled," where there was no evidence of flight, and if "defendant were not guilty he would not be on trial.. . . I know him to be guilty.
I am in possession of facts that convince me of his guilt.''23
Beyond this absolute area, however, the law is not clear. In a recent Illinois
case, 2 4 the court saw a significant difference between the prosecuting attorney
saying to the jury that he believed the defendant to be guilty beyond a
shadow of a doubt, and saying after a summation of facts, that he believed
from the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecutor in that case used the former of the alternative statements and
an exception by the defense attorney was sustained.
A liberal viewpoint on the expression by the prosecutor of his belief in the
guilt of the accused is reflected by a decision rendered by the Supreme Court
of Washington which held that it was permissible to make a statement as
to a belief in the guilt of the accused without directly tying it up with the
5
evidence, provided that the evidence would support such a vidw.2 The court
that a mere
courts
by
some
ruling
the
supported its opinion by reference to
expression of opinion as to guilt is not prejudicial in any event. In a great
number of cases it has been held that the prosecuting attorney's mere expression, in the course of his argument, of his personal belief that the evidence
shows the defendant to be guilty, without anything to indicate that his
opinion was not based on the evidence, is not such error as requires of itself
26
a new trial, or reversal of his conviction, if actual prejudice is not shown.
The foregoing cases illustrate that there is no hard and fast line which the
prosecutor may use as a guide. Again he must combine a knowledge of the
law with a good deal of imagination in order to take full advantage of the
facts of his case. A study of these cases, along with the countless others
dealing with this or related problems, reveals that trial courts are interested in
substantial justice, but that this interest does not force them to repel all
21. 81 Cal. App. 226, 253 Pac. 735 (1927).
22. James v. State, 123 Ga. 129, 51 S.E. 312 (1905).
23. People v. King, 276 I1. 138, 114 N.E. 601 (1916); State v. Newburn, 178 Ore. 238,
116 P.2d 470 (1946).
24. People v. Lawson, 331 I1. 380, 163 N.E. 149 (1928).
25. State v. Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1939) (which holds that, "If the evidence indicates that the defendant is a murderer or a killer it is not prejudicial to designate
him as such .... whether he was a murderer and an assassin was the very question that
was on trial, and we do not consider it improper for the district attorney, in the course of
his argument, to make a statement to the jury which amounted to nothing more or less than
an expression of his opinion that defendant was guilty.")
26. See Note 75 A.L.R. 53 (1931).
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advances by prosecutors into the area of reasonable supposition. What the
general rule might label a "foul" blow may, through a thoughtful analysis,
become a "hard" one.
Appeals to Individual Prejudice
When a jury of twelve people is selected, there is often a certain element
in that group which can be swayed by an appeal to their prejudices. It is
with respect to this possibility that the courts have been particularly careful
to keep the prosecuting attorney within proper bounds, and it is here that
the rules are the most stringent and unyielding.
There have been a multitude of cases where the prosecutor has appealed to
prejudice against people of the Jewish faith.27 Statements such as "I did
not make them Jews. I am not responsible for the fact that they are Jews"
have been held to be highly prejudicial and have led to a reversal of a
conviction. 28 In one case the trial court itself said, "If, indeed, the defendant
not be referred to at all," for which
be a Jew it is no disgrace and should
29
reason the appellate court reversed.
The same type of problem is met in the prosecution of Negroes. Although
appeals to prejudice against Negroes have been rare in northern courts, 0
there have been a great many such cases in the southern states. 3 ' It seems
that the courts have reversed these cases in order to insure a fair trial without
consideration of any other factors.32 Other races and nationalitie have been
accorded the same protection. 3
Outside of this more obvious type of appeal to prejudice, however, there
are more subtle appeals, as for example, making reference to a political
affiliation of the defendant. Associating the defendant with the International
Workers of the World has been held to be sufficient grounds for reversal
where the statement was based in part on evidence which the trial court had
27. See Note 78 A.L.R. 1438 (1932). A very extensive account of all prejudice cases,
both civil and criminal. This section of the comment attempts to draw out the particular
cases where the prosecutor is found to have appealed to prejudice in his summation.
28. People v. Simon, 80 Cal. App. 675, 252 Pac. 758 (1927) (where the court says, "If,
however, where it fairly appears, as we think it does in the case at bar, all the record,
including the evidence considered, that the remarks of the district attorney were a factor in
influencing the jury in arriving at their verdict of guilty, such result is a miscarriage of
justice, and the judgment and order should be reversed. It might be added at this point
that the remarks of the district attorney were in our opinion, of such character that any
attempted correction thereof by the trial court might well have had the effect of further
embedding in the minds of the jury prejudice against the Jewish people when they are
accused of burning insured property.")
29. People v. Newman, 113 Cal. App. 679, 298 Pac. 1044 (1931).
30. People v. Brigham, 234 N.Y. Supp. 567, 226 App. Div. 104 (1929) (where the case
involves the maintenance of a disorderly house by a Negro defendant).
31. Jones v. State, 21 Ala. App. 234, 109 So. 189 (1926) (where argument by the state's
counsel in a criminal case, stressing the fact that defendant was a Negro, was a sufficient
ground for reversal). To the same effect see Green v. State, 22 Ala. App. 56, 112 So. 98
(1927) ; Harris v. State, 22 Ala. App. 121, 113 So. 318 (1927). (The court in the Harris case
said, "Justice is blind, says the law, and in her judgment must see no man, color, race or
condition.") Walton v. State, 147 Miss. 17, 112 So. 189 (1926) (the district attorney said
that the jury should send "negro defendant out of the community for the protection of the
white boys").
32. Morehead v. State, 12 Oki. Crim. Rep. 62, 151 Pac. 1183 (1915) ; Taylor v. State,
50 Tex. Crim. Rep. 560, 100 S.W. 393 (1907).
33. State v. Ulrich, 110 Mo. 350, 19 S.W. 656 (1892) (where the district attorney referred to the defendant as a "sugar loafed, squirrel-headed Dutchman."); Fontenello v.
United States, 19 F.2d 921 (1927) (where the prosecutor said that the majority of persons
running illegal stills were Italians).
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erroneously failed to strike out.8 4 It has also been held reversible error for
the prosecutor to tell the jury that the type of prosecution in which he is
engaged at the moment may cost him votes in the next election.3 5
It may be interesting to note appeals made to prejudice based upon the
wealth or poverty of the defendant. In Newtbn. v. Commonwealth, 6 for
example, the prosecutor stated that the jury had convicted "every trifling
scoundrel and poor country devil," and that if they did not convict the
defendant, who was accused of having illegal possession -of liquor, because
he happened to be wealthy enough to own a three story brick building, it
would be a crime. This was held to be reversible error.
Other areas in which prejudicial appeal will result in a reversal are where
unfair reference
is made to non-union workers,3 7 or to the use of intoxicating
38
liquors.
It may be noted from a careful examination of these cases that this is
a particularly dangerous field for the prosecuting attorney. It is also one
in which the attitude of the courts seems thoroughly justified. The prosecutor
will do well, therefore, to avoid any reference to individual prejudicial
matters. It should be quite simple for any prosecutor to avoid such mistakes
since he should have a very good idea in his own mind whether his contemplated remark is likely to be found prejudicial.
Use of Abusive Language
In his summation to the jury the prosecutor very often attempts to
characterize the defendant in an unfavorable light. Because of this desire,
it is not surprising that many times he will go astray. For example, in a
rape prosecution the prosecutor called the defendants "yellow rats.'" 9 This
was objected to by the defense counsel, but the case resulted in convictions
of both defendants. On appeal the court held that it was improper to make
such a statement, but that it was not enough for a reversal in view of the
weight of the evidence. Similarly it has been held improper to refer to the
defendant as a "hoodlum." 40 One of the most significant cases in the field,
however, is the leading case of Commonwealth v. Capella.4 ' The defendant
in this case was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter despite his plea
of self-defense. He appealed the decision and his third assignment of error
was based upon the court's overruling his objection to the prosecutor's
closing argument. The prosecutor, in that summation pointed to defendant
and called him a "cold blooded killer." The court said that it was no part
34. People v. Rosa, 97 Cal. App. 501, 275 Pac. 961 (1929) (where a statement by the
district attorney that the defendant's mother had had nothing to do with him since the
I.W.W. got hold of him was held to constitute a sufficient ground for the reversal of a conviction of arson).
35. People v. Brigham, 226 App. Div. 104, 234 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1929).
36. 195 Ky. 764, 243 S.W. 1031 (1922).
37. State v. McPherson, 114 Minn. 498, 113 N.W. 645 (1911) (where the district attorney
said that the defendant was a "scab who bought a revolver to shoot union sailors with"
and the court felt that this was improper but not alone enough to cause a reversal).
38. Boyd v. State, 108 Tex. Crim. Rep. 221, 299 S.W. 645 (1927) (where the prosecutor
said that the state must "keep big old town boys like this defendant from going around the
country raping little country girls."
39. People v. Burnette, 39 Cal. App. 2d 215, 102 P.2d 799 (1940).
40. State v. Palmer, 206 Minn. 185, 288 N.W. 160, (1939) (where the court says of the
prejudicial remark "it is not an argument"). See also 5 Dunnel, Minn. Dig. (2d ed. &
Supps.) paragraph 7102 (see note 69 thereunder) ; State v. Clark, 114 Minn. 342, 131 N.W.
369 (1911) ; State v. Peterson, 153 Minn. 310, 190 N.W. 345 (1922).
41. 322 Pa. 200, 185 A. 203 (1936).
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of the prosecutor's duty or right to stigmatize the defendant. The court
reasoned that the prosecutor had a right to argue that the evidence proves
the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, but to characterize him
as a "cold blooded killer" is something quite different. One of the interesting
parts of the opinion appears in a footnote to the principal case:
"All prosecuting attorneys would do well to study as a model the
justly renowned address of Daniel Webster in the case of Commonwealth
of Massachusetts v. John F. Knapp for the murder of Capt. Joseph White.
No more powerful and convincing address in a criminal trial is to be
found in any language, and yet nowhere during the course of the closing
argument for the commonwealth did Webster apply any epithets to
the defendant or express any opinion as to his guilt or innocence. At
the outset of his address he made it clear that as the commonwealth's
attorney he would not attempt to hurry the jury against the law or
beyond the evidence. After a vivid and moving word picture of the killing
of the victim as he slept, 'the beams of the moon resting on the gray locks
of his aged temple,' Webster made a clear and complete analysis of the
testimony and showed how it logically pointed to the guilt of the accused.
In almost his final paragraph he said, 'Toward him (i.e. the defendant),
as an individual, the law inculcates no hostility, but toward him if proved
to be a murderer, the oaths you have taken and public justice demand
you to do your duty.' It should be noted that Webster did not characterize the defendant as a murderer or as a 'cold blooded killer.' Instead of
that, he impressed upon the members of the jury that they should do
their duty 'if' the defendant on trial 'proved to be the murderer.' "
In light of this excellent summation it seems unnecessary to go into a
more complete analysis of the cases. It would be well, however, to point
out the fact that courts will allow a prosecutor to reflect unfavorably on
the accused or to denounce his wickedness if his remarks are based upon
competent evidence.4 2 The question as to whether or not the evidence supports
such a comment is often a difficult one. However, the prosecuting attorney
should realize that there are not a large number of cases where convictions
are reversed because of a mistake of this nature. It may be worthwhile for
the prosecutor to adjust his remarks along these lines carefully and yet
affirmatively, so that he will not only be giving the defendant a fair trial,
but also will be presenting the case for the state in the most convincing
manner possible.
Retaliatory Statements and Remarks
There are instances in a criminal trial where defense counsel may open
the way for certain comments by the prosecuting attorney which may not
otherwise be tolerated by the trial court. 43 For example in Baker v. United
States.44 defense counsel had attacked the integrity of one of the witnesses
for the prosecution, whereupon the prosecutor said, of that witness: "He at
least had manhood enough and respectability enough to leave Baker when
he found out what sort of a racket he had. And then, another thing that
strikes me as strikingly strange, is that there is not one line of testimony to
42. People v. Gleitsmann, 384 I1.
App. 696, 54 N.E.2d 638 (1944).

43.

303, 51 N.E.2d 261 (1943) ; People v. Moe, 322 I1.

State v. Lande, 345 Mo. 185, 132 S.W.2d 501 (1939) (where the record discloses that

the statement objected to was in direct reply to arguments advanced on behalf of appel-

lants, and the court has ruled legitimate argument in reply is not improper).
44. 115 F.2d 533 (1940).
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contradict what Bunker the witness said. If Bunker is Bunk, why didn't
they prove it? But they were silent. . . ." The court allowed this comment
by the prosecutor. They reasoned that if it appears that the counsel for
the defendant provoked the remarks of the prosecuting attorney by assailing
the veracity and credibility of the witness, the prosecutor may reply to the
argument and in so doing make statements which would otherwise be improper.
State courts have used the same type of reasoning where the retaliatory
statement related to quite different matters.4 5 Appellant complained of
certain remarks of the prosecutor in his closing argument to the jury, in
which the prosecutor referred to the defendant's character, which had not
been put in issue. The court held that although the law is clear that such
a comment by the prosecutor is improper, it was apparent, upon the facts
of the case, that the alleged prejudicial comment was made in reply to an
argument that had been made by the defendant's counsel. The courts have
begun to hold generally that "where remarks are provoked and invited by
opposing counsel it does not constitute error.''46
In these cases it seems that the trial court will allow a great deal of latitude
if it is felt that the defense attorney himself brought about the situation.
The prosecutor may deduce from this that he would do well to watch carefully
for certain mistakes that the defense counsel may make, and, instead of
objecting if that course is open to him, attempt to take advantage of that
mistake in the manner in which it has been done in the foregoing cases. On
the other hand it may be very difficult for the prosecutor to know whether
or not he will gain a new freedom because of the remark of defense counsel.
If he should be wrong, he will have waived the privilege of objecting to what
the defense attorney has said without gaining anything by his strategy.
Contusion
How can a prosecuting attorney make his summation a more effective one?
First, he must prepare his summation after carefully studying the position
of his own state court on what he feels may be a controversial matter. Along
with this he should whenever possible consider what courts in other states
allow. The protection required to be given the accused by the prosecution
should be based upon what the courts and statutes of the state encompass and
need not be amplified by further safeguards which the prosecutor personally
thinks should be given. It is felt here that the making of new law in the
way of restriction on the prosecution is not a part of the prosecutor's quasijudicial function.
Secondly, the prosecutor must develop his strategy not with a mind to
completely avoiding the use of effective arguments which may be ruled
prejudicial, but with an attempt to get the maximum value from the material
which he has in his possession. This, of course, must be done within the
scope of good ethical standards.
Finally, the prosecutor must realize not only that reversals are expensive to
the community and himself in time and money, but that a miscarriage of
justice caused by an ineffective prosecution may cost society considerably more.
45. Moyers v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. Rep. 387, 120 S.W.2d 597 (1938) (where the prosecutor was allowed to tell the jury in his closing argument that he had, on several occasions,
told juries that in his opinion the accused on trial was innocent and should be acquitted;
because the argument complained of was made in reply to argument made by defendant's
counsel).
46. State v. Lindsay, 192 Wash. 356, 73 P.2d 391 (1937) ; Oliver v. Taylor, 119 Wash.
190, 205 Pac. 746 (1922) ; State v. Banton, 150 Wash. 59, 173 Pac. 723 (1918).

